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1. introduction
The study examines the argumentative competencies of 
people with Asperger syndrome (AS) and compares this 
with those of normal – or what are called neurotypical (NT) 
– subjects. To investigate how people with AS recognise, 
evaluate and engage in argumentation, we have adapted and 
applied the empirical instrument developed by van Eemeren, 
Garssen and Meuffels to study the conventional validity of 
the pragma-dialectical freedom rule (van Eemeren, Gars-
sen & Meuffels 2003a; 2003b; 2005a; 2005b; van Eemeren 
& Meuffels, 2002). Our paper begins with some background 
information on Asperger syndrome and how it impacts upon 
communication and argumentation; then it addresses the 
research questions and methods used; thirdly, it presents 
some initial findings; finally, it will conclude with some im-
plications for those people with AS, for those they come into 
contact with and for the pragma-dialectic model in general. 
2. asperger syndrome (AS)
Asperger Syndrome is a neurological disorder named after 
Hans Asperger. In 1944, Asperger published a paper that 
described patterns of behaviour in young men who had 
normal intelligence and language development, but who 
also had deficiencies in social and communication skills. 
Despite being identified in the 1940s, Asperger syndrome 
(AS) is a relatively new category of developmental disorder, 
and was only ‘officially’ recognized in 1994, in the fourth 
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM IV) of 
the American Psychiatric Association. AS is often associated 
with what is called the high functioning end of the autistic 
spectrum (Frith, 1991) although there is considerable debate 
about whether AS is high-functioning autism, or something 
else (Frith, 2004). It is generally accepted that AS, like autistic 
conditions, is a neurologically-based developmental disorder, 
in which there are deviations in three broad aspects of de-
velopment: first, social relatedness and social skills; second, 
impaired communication, and a lack of pragmatic skills in 
particular; and third, certain behavioural characteristics in-
volving repetitive, or what are called perseverative features, 
often accompanied by an intense interest in a limited range 
of subjects. It is the level of deficiency in these three catego-
ries – social-relatedness, communication & behaviour (which 
Wing (1993) has called the “triad of impairments”) – which 
can range from relatively mild to severe, that defines all of the 
pervasive developmental disorders, from those with mild AS 
through to the profoundly autistic. 
Recently, however, there has been a move away from defin-
ing AS in terms of weaknesses, deficiencies and deviance. 
For example, Dickerson et al (2005: 20) point out that much 
research on autism, in general, is “comparative, framed 
around notions of identifiable ‘deficit’ in Autism and juxta-
posed against assumed ‘normal’ capabilities”. This, they ar-
gue, is an unhelpful approach, borne of a diagnostic agenda, 
focusing on what people with autism cannot do, rather than 
looking at the ways that they actually deploy communicative 
skills in interaction – and hence ways that practice can be im-
proved. The study of AS has previously been placed in a nega-
tive frame whereby the aspects most worthy of attention are 
those that are considered not normal. There is little room left 
for the strengths of the individual to come through, and little 
opportunity for people with AS to appear as real people in the 
research as opposed to subjects with a syndrome. Notably, 
in contrast with the diagnostic DSM IV, Gray and Attwood 
(1999) offer the ‘discovery criteria’ that define AS in terms of 
the strengths of people they call ‘Aspies’. But it remains the 
case that there are clear problems associated with having AS. 
So while it is not uncommon to see people with AS in main-
stream educational or professional settings – and they can 
hold down jobs and can be quite successful – their social and 
communicative problems may lead to intense frustration, 
feelings of worthlessness and social isolation. Estimates of 
the rates of depression for people with AS or high-function-
ing autism range from 30% (Wing, 1981) to 37% (Ghaziud-
din et al, 1998). Similarly raised rates of other psychiatric 
disorders have also been found (Ghaziuddin, 2002).
One particularly interesting feature of AS (like other au-
tistic conditions) is the lack of what has been called a ‘theory 
of mind’: the ability to understand that others have beliefs, 
desires and intentions that are different from one’s own. 
What this amounts to is that people with Asperger’s find it 
difficult “to put themselves into another person’s shoes and 
to imagine what their own actions look like and feel like from 
another person’s point of view” (Frith, 2004: 676). While some 
people with autism may never gain this ability to empathize, 
people with AS may be able to develop such an ability. While 
they lack an inborn ability to perceive the mental or emotional 
states of others – what Frith has called an “intuitive mentalis-
ing” (Frith, 2004: 667) – they can learn and, when conversing, 







use “an explicit theory of mind to compute effects on the 
recipient of the[ir] message” (Ibid.). Amongst other things, 
this means that through treatments such as language-com-
munication therapy – where the implicit rules of interaction 
are taught explicitly – the disaffection felt by people with AS 
can be reduced (Ozonoff et al, 2002: 90). The communicative 
competencies of people with AS are discussed in more detail 
in the next section
3. AS and communication
It is clear from anecdotal and clinical experience, as well as 
from research, that people with AS display problems with dis-
course – with language in use. In fact these “communicative 
problems constitute some of the most significant social hand-
icaps in the syndrome, leading to frustration and distress for 
the individuals and others” (Adams et al, 2002: 680). 
These difficulties are displayed in a number of ways: 
first, how they speak. Although people with AS (particularly 
children) “speak grammatically, they do not always speak 
appropriately” (Kremer-Sadlik, 2004: 185). They display a 
number of characteristic features, including “formal pedantic 
language, odd prosody, peculiar voice characteristics, literal 
interpretation of meaning, too much or too little talk, lack of 
cohesion, idiosyncratic use of words and repetitive patterns 
of speech” (Szatmari, Bartolucci & Brenner, 1989; Gillberg, 
1989). Similarly, Frith (1998: 54) has come across complaints 
about AS speech patterns that suggest they speak in “too 
much of a monotone, too much like sing-song, too soft, too 
loud, too fast, too slow, wooden and stilted. This diversity”, 
she argues, suggests that “there is nothing wrong with the 
voice, only the modulation and the use of the voice in the 
service of communication.”
Second, non-verbal cues can be a problem for people with 
AS – particularly eye contact, which is noticeably different. 
Often someone with AS will look away when you are talk-
ing to them, but will look at you when they are talking to 
you. This might seem subtle, but it can be very unnerving 
for neurotypical subjects, who often find themselves feeling 
uncomfortable or unsure that the person is actually listening 
to them. Tantam (2003) argues that this is in fact a very pro-
found aspect of AS - people do not have the ability to use gaze 
as a social cue or to signify attention; this in turn can lead to 
breakdown in communication with the end result that the 
person feels rejected and, after repeated ‘failures’, can even 
withdraw from communicating altogether. 
Third, as Grice (1975) observed: “Talk is not a series of dis-
connected remarks.” To construct coherent speech effectively, 
“a speaker needs to construct what he or she knows about the 
listener’s thoughts, knowledge, desires and intentions, in or-
der to tailor the content and other aspects of his or her talk to 
the listener” (Kremer-Sadlik, 2004: 187). But because of their 
difficulties perceiving others’ intentions and perspectives and 
their impaired capacity to read the unspoken gestures and 
nuances in everyday social communication, individuals with 
AS often respond inappropriately or not at all in interaction. 
This impairment is noticeable at a number of discursive 
levels, and appears to be fundamentally related to the theory 
of mind hypothesis. Pragmatic accounts of communication, 
such as Grice’s, stress “the importance of mentalizing for 
intentional communication” (Ziatas, Durkin & Pratt, 2003: 
75). For example, in a study of conversational implicatures, 
Surian et al (1996) investigated the ability of children with 
autism to identify violations of Gricean maxims. They found 
that the “children with autism able to pass the theory of mind 
task also did well in identifying violations of Gricean max-
ims” (Ziatas, Durkin & Pratt, 2003: 76). That said, the overly 
pendantic style of speech that characterises some people with 
AS – in which “the speaker conveys more information than 
the topic and goals of the conversation demand” (Ghaziuddin 
& Gerstein, 1996) – does contravene the Gricean maxims of 
quantity and (sometimes) relevance.
At a micro level, Happé (1993) looked at the role of theory 
of mind in understanding similes, metaphors and irony. And 
the relationship is very clear: “those children who were un-
able to pass even the first order theory of mind task were able 
to pass the simile task but not the metaphor or irony tasks. 
Those able to pass the first order but not the second order 
theory of mind task were able to complete both the simile and 
metaphor tasks, and those able to pass both first and second 
order theory of mind tasks were able to comprehend similes, 
metaphors and irony” (Ziatas, Durkin & Pratt, 2003: 76). 
To summarise, the communicative problems of people 
with AS centre on pragmatics- on prosody and voice modula-
tion, on recognizing and adhering to Gricean maxims and on 
recognizing certain tropes such as metaphors and irony.
4. AS and argumentation
There does not appear to be any existent research on the argu-
mentation of people with AS, despite the fact that they often 
find themselves in conflict situations due, in part, to their in-
ability to read social cues accurately. The lack of such research 
suggests that researchers are unwilling or unable to engage 
with those with AS and this is supported by the apparent bias 
in the research literature towards quantitative research and 
away from qualitative studies. Mercier et al comment on the 
restricted interests in high functioning persons with perva-
sive developmental disorders:
When one reviews the literature, it is striking how 
little use is made of certain methodological ap-
proaches in seeking to understand high-functioning 
autism. In the last few years, populational epidemi-
ology, neuropsychology, and the various branches of 
neurobiology, especially genetics, have permitted sig-
nificant advances (for a review, see Bailey et al., 1996; 
Bryson, 1997; Happé and Frith, 1996). On the other 
hand, qualitative approaches linked to psychosocial 
research and based on methods such as in-depth 
interviews, discourse analysis or case studies have 
remained greatly underused (Denzin and Lincoln, 
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1994; Miles and Huberman, 1994). Only a few quali-
tative studies are to be found in the literature in this 
field. They primarily deal with case reports (Williams 
et al., 1996) or with the way families come to terms 
with autism and with the relations between profes-
sionals and parents (Gray, 1993; 1994; 1997). (Mercier, 
Mottron, & Belleville, 2000: 408)
Another striking characteristic of much of the available re-
search is that it relies much more on the opinions and views 
of parents or caregivers than the person(s) with AS them-
selves. Whilst this may be a result of the difficulties which 
people with AS have in maintaining social relationships with 
others, it also suggests that people with AS are not considered 
capable of speaking up for themselves, or that their accounts 
are not accepted as reliable unless corroborated by another. 
Based on general communicative difficulties, summarised 
in the preceding section, we expect that people with AS will 
have argumentative competencies different to neurotypical 
(NT) people and may not always follow the accepted rules 
of argumentation. Superficially, we expect that their argu-
mentation will be overly logical and, as Stenning and van 
Lambalgan (nd: 220) have claimed, driven by “an obsessive 
attempt to extract exceptionless truth about a complicated 
world.” In their discovery criteria, Attwood and Gray (1999: 
2) put it slightly differently, suggesting that AS discourse is 
often characterised by an “ability to pursue personal theory 
or perspective despite conflicting evidence” – which is a nice 
spin on saying that they may perseverate or just not listen to 
other people’s point of view. Perseverative thoughts – where 
the person with AS returns to a particular line of thinking 
unexpectedly or without apparent linking from the directly 
previous content of conversation, resulting in incohesive 
communication - may cause particular problems in interac-
tion. 
More specifically related to pragma-dialectics, and the 
pragmatic difficulties in recognising or observing the 
Gricean maxims, a small amount of other research has 
been done on the use of assertive speech acts, but none of 
this relates explicitly to expressing standpoints or advancing 
argumentation. Ziatas, Durkin & Pratt (2003) for example, 
studied assertive speech acts produced by children, focusing 
on assertives that relate closely with a theory of mind. That 
is: internal reports, expressing emotions, intents & other 
mental states; attributions, expressing beliefs about another’s 
state; and explanations, expressing reasons or relationships 
between phenomena. The children with AS used more inter-
nal state assertions than the other groups (with autism, SLI 
& NT), though some of these were inappropriate (echolalia); 
correspondingly, children with AS used fewer assertions re-
lating to another’s mental state (‘you’re thinking…’, ‘you don’t 
know…’, ‘you believe…’) than the other groups. Clearly this 
isn’t argumentation, because the discourse didn’t take place 
in a context of disagreement. But these findings – essentially 
showing the difficulties that people with AS have in discern-
ing another’s point of view when it isn’t fully externalised 
– may be significant in studying their argumentation. 
Anecdotally, it does appear as though people with AS often 
lack the necessary social skills to persuade other people. This 
deficit in interpersonal communication has implications for 
their ability to function independently in a complex social 
world where persuasion plays an important role in ensuring 
that one’s needs are met. This may also relate to Michael Gil-
bert’s recent work on emotional argumentation – specifically, 
the “dissonance between a logical discursive message and the 
emotional content or context of that message” (2005: 44-45). 
People with AS seem particularly prone to feeling this disso-
nance or are unable to understand the emotional perspective 
of others and hence to decode this dissonance. This seems 
like it could be a particularly fruitful avenue to explore when 
analysing the argumentation of AS. 
5. research questions
The review of current literature around AS and argumenta-
tion has thrown up a series of research questions. They are 
formulated as questions, rather than hypotheses, due to the 
exploratory nature of the work. These first two are the focus 
of work currently in progress:
 
1. Will AS respondents evaluate speech acts involving ad 
hominem fallacies as less reasonable than non-fallacious 
speech acts?
2. Does the evaluation of fallacious/non-fallacious speech 
acts by AS respondents show greater variance than the 
data of NT respondents?
The next four may be the focus of future work. It seems 
the main argumentative problems of people with AS are felt 
during social interaction as a result of inabilities to pick up 
and/or translate emotional or other pragmatic cues. On this 
basis:
3. Is AS face-to-face argumentation more or less reasonable 
than NT participants? In what ways (if any) do AS arguers 
find face-to-face argumentation problematic?
4. Are AS written arguments (both A1 and A2, in O’Keefe’s 
(1977) terms) more or less reasonable than NT partici-
pants? In what ways (if any) do AS arguers find written 
arguments problematic? 
5. Are certain pragma-dialectical rules of reasonableness 
more problematic (in terms of their recognition and ap-
plication) for AS arguers? 
6. Conversely, are certain pragma-dialectical rules of reason-
ableness less problematic (in terms of their recognition 
and application) for AS arguers? 
It may be that some rules are easy for Aspies to follow in ad-
vancing their own arguments, but very problematic when it 
comes to the arguments of others. For example, the ambigu-
ity rule or the standpoint rule may not be especially difficult 
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for Aspies to follow: they tend to be very literal, or in the words 
of Attwood and Gray (1999: 2), to communicate in a style that 
is “free of hidden meaning or agenda”. However, unless the 
standpoint of the other party is fully externalised, and argu-
ment presented in an explicit, accurate and literal way, the ap-
plication of these rules in context may be difficult.
6. methods
To explore our first two questions, we have taken 12 of the short 
discourse fragments constructed by van Eemeren, Garssen and 
Meuffels (2003a; 2003b; 2005a; 2005b) nine of which contain 
fallacies and three of which do not (see APPENDIX 1). Respon-
dents were asked to judge the reaction of the antagonist and 
rate it on a 7 point Likert scale – though, to make the scale was 
clearer to the AS respondents, the labels were changed slightly 
from those used in van Eemeren, Garssen and Meuffels’ work, 
to 1 meaning ‘entirely unreasonable’ to 7 meaning ‘entirely 
reasonable’. The research instrument includes exchanges in 
three settings: domestic, political and scientific (or academic). 
For each of these settings there are 4 exchanges: a direct ad ho-
minem, an indirect or circumstantial ad hominem, a tu quoque 
ad hominem and a non-fallacious standpoint. There is a sizable 
body of literature summarising the findings of these studies, 
and it would therefore be interesting to see if these results are 
replicated for AS respondents. 
The second group of questions are for future research 
– though initial results do suggest some interesting things 
relating to question 4, on written arguments. Eventually we 
intend to collect data from face-to-face interviews with AS 
clients (ASIn) in which they discuss personal histories of 
communicative problems. We also intend to collect data from 
focus groups with AS clients (ASFg) where participants will be 
presented with a series of contentious or perhaps controversial 
standpoints and asked to evaluate them. These will then be 
compared to similar focus group sessions with NT subjects 
(NTFg).
7. initial results
From only three respondents thus far, there are some interest-
ing though extremely tentative findings. The table here shows 
the average judgements for the three respondents:












1 4.33 7.00 3.00 5.00 5.00
2 4.33 5.67 4.00 4.33 4.67
3 4.11 5.00 3.67 5.00 3.67
Mean 4.26 5.89 3.56 4.78 4.45
Given the extremely small n-base, it is not possible to offer any 
firm conclusions, but the table does suggest three things: first, 
the respondents do appear to consider violations of the free-
dom rule to be less reasonable than non-fallacious responses. 
However, the fallacious responses, as a whole, were considered 
to be just this side of reasonable. This is slightly higher than 
the Amsterdam studies – which found a mean of 3.75. Looking 
at the three variants of the ad hominem fallacy, the respondents 
were more critical of the direct or abusive variant than they 
were of the other two. This finding is in agreement with the 
findings of the Amsterdam studies, although again our aver-
age here is slightly higher than their NT respondents.
But these averages do cover up some significant differences 
between the three respondents. Respondent 1 – a woman in 
her early 20s – answered either a 1 or a 7 to every fragment: it 
was either ‘entirely unreasonable’ or ‘entirely reasonable’. In a 
follow-up email she said:
I found it difficult to make decisions about degrees of 
reasonableness. I tend to see things as OK or not OK 
with no grey areas. I hope that is alright.
Each of the non-fallacious responses she judged correctly 
(which is why her average is 7), but her judgments of the falla-
cies were less successful: she thought that 5 of the 9 fallacious 
responses were ‘entirely reasonable’ which reduced her aver-
age. This was different to the other two respondents – both 
male, one 21 and the other 18. The judgements of these two 
respondents had less variance: on only 2 occasions did they 
judge a fragment to be either a 1 or a 7. This may be due to their 
respective experiences of AS: both of the men were diagnosed 
as children, whereas the female was only diagnosed as a young 
adult. This meant that the two men benefited from specialised 
schooling. The mother of one of the men wrote to explain that 
since 2000 her son had been at a school for young people with 
communication difficulties. He had benefited from having a 
weekly session with a speech and language therapist, and a lot 
of work had been done with him “on his social skills and relat-
ing to others, not least helping him to appreciate that others 
have different points of view and that it is right to respect this.” 
Nonetheless, he still found the exercise difficult – he stated at 
the end that he found it difficult because of the “Lack of facts 
about the argument”. Nevertheless, he still provided more 
finely graded judgements of the discourse fragments than our 
first respondent. When the first respondent was asked why she 
found it difficult and whether there was any problem with the 
clarity of the questionnaire, her reply was revealing:
In reality if I heard two people having any of the ex-
changes listed I would probably feel confused as to 
how they meant it… Were they being aggressive?, jok-
ing?, cruel?, friendly? […] When I was reading person 
B’s responses I struggled to imagine what they meant 
or why they were saying it in the way they did. The 
only reasoning I could use to decide whether they 
were being reasonable or not was to decide whether 
or not their response was justified given the apparent 
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circumstances […] I know that people’s feelings should 
be important too, but I could not imagine what the 
people involved might be feeling given the limited 
information.
This excerpt is interesting for a number of reasons. It suggests 
the importance of contextual cues in the way that ordinary 
language users reconstruct argumentation in order to analyse 
it. Here she tries to use an explicit theory of mind that she’s 
learnt to try and decide whether B’s responses were justified. 
Emotional cues are one of perhaps many inputs used in this 
reconstruction, which – in the case of this woman and perhaps 
people with AS as a whole – is what creates difficulties in judg-
ing the reasonableness of certain speech acts.
8. conclusion: the study’s contribution
This ongoing study will hopefully contribute to a better under-
standing of the condition of AS in general; and of the discourse 
of adults with AS in particular, who tend to be under-repre-
sented in the literature. In terms of argumentation theory, 
our study should be viewed as part of the pragma-dialectical 
research programme, and will add further detail to the data col-
lected thus far on the conventional validity of the freedom rule. 
In addition, our results may contribute to the more analytical 
work by Gilbert (2005) on the emotional content of argumen-
tation and specifically on the role that emotional cues play in 
ordinary language users’ reconstruction of argument. But pri-
marily the study is a practical piece of research- once complete: 
a list of “guidelines for good arguing” will be produced which 
will hopefully help people with AS to engage in arguments 
more appropriately. Therefore this study can be classed as “Ac-
tion Research” in that the results will hopefully directly benefit 
the participants themselves and people like them.
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Domestic 1 (direct ad hominem)
A: I think Ford cars drive better; they shoot across the road.
B: How would you know? You don’t know the first thing about 
cars.
Domestic 2 (indirect ad hominem)
A: Mum, I really think you should buy a new camera; the one 
you have isn’t any good.
B: Wouldn’t you like that! I bet you just want to get your hands 
on my old camera. 
Domestic 3 (tu quo que ad hominem)
A: I think you’d better not eat so much chocolate; it affects your 
weight.
B: Look who’s talking! Your own tummy is getting bigger and 
bigger. 
Domestic 4 (no fallacy)
A: I think you can safely trust me with that car; my driving is 
fine.
B: I don’t believe a word you’re saying! You’ve borrowed my car 
twice and both times you’ve damaged it. 
Scientific 1 (direct ad hominem)
A: In my opinion, you have been acting unethically; you failed 
to inform your patients about what they would be exposed 
to.
B: What do you know about medical ethics? You are not a 
medical specialist yourself.
Scientific 2 (indirect ad hominem)
A: In my view, it is highly questionable whether smoking re-
ally causes cancer; there are studies which deny it.
B: Do you want me to accept that opinion from you? Everyone 
knows your research is sponsored by the tobacco industry. 
Scientific 3 (tu quo que ad hominem)
A: I believe the way in which you processed your data statisti-
cally is not entirely correct; you should have expressed the 
figures in percentages.
B: You’re not being serious! Your own statistics aren’t that 
good either.
Scientific 4 (no fallacy)
A: I believe my scientific integrity to be impeccable; my re-
search has always been honest and sound.
B: Do you really want us to believe you? You have been caught 
tampering with your research results twice. 
Political 1 (direct ad hominem)
A: In my opinion, making people work on a Sunday is terrible 
- they’ll never get any relaxation.
B: But you belong to a religious party! How could you ever 
objectively assess the pros and cons of such a decision? 
Political 2 (indirect ad hominem)
A: In my view, the best company for improving Social Ser-
vices is Capita. They are the only contractor in Britain that 
can handle such an enormous job. 
B: Do you really think that we can believe you? It’s not a coin-
cidence that you recommend this company – it’s owned by 
your father-in-law. 
Political 3 (tu quo que ad hominem)
A: I believe that a minister should not withhold any informa-
tion from Parliament; this would mean the end of democ-
racy.
B: Of all people, I can’t believe you’re saying this! You once 
tried for months to keep a case of subsidy fraud secret. 
Political 4 (no fallacy)
A: In my view, we have never used empty election slogans; we 
have always kept our promises.
B: No one believes you! You promised lower taxes in the last 
election campaign but people have to pay considerably 
more taxes since you have come to power. 
